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Chapter 4
The Risk and Policy Space for Loss
and Damage: Integrating Notions
of Distributive and Compensatory Justice
with Comprehensive Climate Risk
Management
Thomas Schinko, Reinhard Mechler and Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler
Abstract The Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism holds high appeal for com-
plementing actions on climate change adaptation and mitigation, and for deliver-
ing needed support for tackling intolerable climate related-risks that will neither be
addressed by mitigation nor by adaptation. Yet, negotiations under the UNFCCC
are caught between demands for climate justice, understood as compensation, for
increases in extreme and slow-onset event risk, and the reluctance of other parties to
consider Loss and Damage outside of an adaptation framework. Working towards a
jointly acceptable positionwe suggest an actionableway forward for the deliberations
may be based on aligning comprehensive climate risk analytics with distributive and
compensatory justice considerations. Our proposed framework involves in a short-
medium term, needs-based perspective support for climate risk management beyond
countries ability to absorb risk. In a medium-longer term, liability-based perspective
we particularly suggest to consider liabilities attributable to anthropogenic climate
change and associated impacts. We develop the framework based on principles of
need and liability, and identify the policy space for Loss and Damage as composed
of curative and transformative measures. Transformative measures, such as managed
retreat, have already received attention in discussions on comprehensive climate risk
management. Curative action is less clearly defined, and more contested. Among
others, support for a climate displacement facility could qualify here. For both sets
of measures, risk financing (such as ‘climate insurance’) emerges as an entry point
for further policy action, as it holds potential for both risk management as well as
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compensation functions. To quantify the Loss and Damage space for specific coun-
tries, we suggest as one option to build on a risk layering approach that segments
risk and risk interventions according to risk tolerance. An application to fiscal risks
in Bangladesh and at the global scale provides an estimate of countries’ financial
support needs for dealing with intolerable layers of flood risk. With many aspects of
Loss and Damage being of immaterial nature, we finally suggest that our broad risk
and justice approach in principle can also see application to issues such as migration
and preservation of cultural heritage.
Keywords Climate justice · Loss and Damage space · Transformative measures
Curative measures · Climate risk management
4.1 Tackling Climate-Related Risk in a Contested Policy
Context
The 19th conference of the Parties (COP 19) in Warsaw in 2013 saw the establish-
ment of the “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage” (UNFCCC
2014). With Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a) Loss and Damage
(L&D) can now be regarded as a sort of “3rd pillar of the work under the UNFCCC
in addition to mitigation and adaptation” (Verheyen 2012). The terrain is extremely
contested with highly-at risk countries of the global South (such as those of the
Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS) demanding compensation payments for
actual past, present and future incurred losses and damages due to climate change,
while Annex I countries are unwilling to consider such framing and any related
actions (see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018; chapters by Calliari et al. 2018;
chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018). Yet, these parties have shown willing-
ness to support climate change adaptation (CCA) and have supported ‘good’ risk
management over the years to tackle potential loss and damage, as evidenced by
intense debates on moral responsibility that preceded the approval of the Sendai
Framework of Action (SFA) in March 2015. Interestingly, this discussion also saw
heated debate as developing countries started to frame their interventions around the
common, but differentiated responsibility logic, which has been fundamental for the
UNFCCC discussion (Mysiak et al. 2015).
Liability and compensation on the one hand, and support for disaster risk man-
agement plus insurance on the other hand remain key negotiation positions for the
parties. The divergence in perspectives (see also chapter by James et al. 2018) has led
to difficult negotiations for the Executive Committee, which was established in 2015
to support the implementation of an informational work programme. Currently, the
work programme somewhat balances the two perspectives without explicitly refer-
ring to justice and equity principles (more on the politics behind L&D can be found
in the chapter by Calliari et al. 2018).
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The science behind climate-related risks relevant for the L&D debate is equally
complex. It has made great leaps forward with IPCC’s SREX and IPCC’s Working
Group II reports as well as the UNGAR publications, which discuss climate and non-
climate drivers of climate-related risk, the role of uncertainty, the role of attribution
and the relevance of climate risk management (CRM) (IPCC 2012, 2013, 2014;
UNISDR2015). Overall, the science shows that, while anthropogenic climate change
indeed amplifies intensity, frequency andduration ofmanyhazards, a clear causal link
from anthropogenic CO2 emissions as a driver of risk to quantified socioeconomic
risks cannot be established, and that therefore a principle of strict liability cannot
(yet) be applied to climate risk (for more details on the frontiers in science regarding
L&D see the chapters Bouwer 2018; James et al. 2018 and Lopez et al. 2018). In this
context, Mechler and Schinko (2016) proposed a policy framework that builds on
recent IPCC framing and evidence on climate-related risk, and Schinko andMechler
(2017) suggested to apply recent insights from CRM, an approach that strives for
linking disaster risk reduction (DRR) and CCA agendas under one umbrella (see
Schinko et al. 2016) to L&D. The authors argued that a better understanding of
climate-related disaster risk and risk management can inform effective action on
CCA and point a way forward for L&D policy as well as practice.
This chapter takes this proposition forward to the L&D debate and suggests to
find a balance between notions of compensatory and distributive justice. While the
compensatory justice notion’s scope is distributing responsibilities in light of com-
pensatory reasons and liability, the notion of distributive justice understands L&D
as undeserved harm demanding redistribution to even out this unfairness (see also
chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018; Dellink et al. 2009 on the fair distribution
of CCA costs). As a principle of strict liability cannot yet be applied to climate-
related risk, we suggest an actionable way forward for the deliberations under the
WIM based on the concept of CRM, which allows for an alignment of distribu-
tive and compensatory justice over time. The approach involves in a short-medium,
needs-based perspective, international support for risk management beyond individ-
ual countries’ ability to cope with climate-related risk; in a medium-longer term,
rights-based perspective, we particularly argue for a strong consideration for liabili-
ties attributable to human induced climate change. The discussion can be integrated
towards a principled framework for identifying the space for Loss and Damage com-
posed of curative and transformative measures.
As another key element to operationalise CRM in the context of L&D in practice,
we put forward ‘risk layering’ as an actionable concept of risk and risk management
(Mechler et al. 2014). This concept involves identifying efficient and acceptable
interventions based on recurrence as well as severity of climate-related risks. For
example, for flood risk, this would mean identifying physical flood protection to
deal with more frequent events, considering risk financing for infrequent disasters as
well as relying on public and international compensation for extreme catastrophes.
Risk layering overall points towards considering risk comprehensively as determined
by climatic and non-climatic factors as well as considering portfolios of options that
manage risks today and in the future.
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The further discussion in this chapter is organised as follows: Sect. 4.2 provides a
short definition of L&Dand aims at identifyingmajor building blocks of a framework
for L&D. Section 4.3 takes this discussion forward, and based on our three building
blocks identifies the risk and policy space for Loss and Damage. The concept of risk
layering based on risk-basedmodelling is put forward as amethod for quantifying the
Loss and Damage space in Sect. 4.4, which is followed by some short conclusions.
4.2 Building Blocks of a Principled Framework for Loss
and Damage
Many analysts and parties have argued that the WIM is to deal with climate-related
risks ‘beyond adaptation’ when coping capacities of communities and countries are
exceededv (see e.g. Verheyen 2012). This is also reflected in what the parties to the
UNFCC acknowledge in decision 2/CP.19 when they state that L&D “includes, and
in some cases involvesmore than, that which can be reduced by adaptation” (UNFCC
2014). Beyond this consensus, little common ground exists and particularly ethical
aspects have been the elephant in the room ever since the early stages of the debate on
L&D. The following discussion aims at overcoming the ethical challenges involved
in the discourse by referring to the debate via notions of climate justice and a CRM
perspective (see also the chapter by Wallimann-Helmer et al. 2018 for more detailed
exploration of the ethical challenges in the debate).
Defining Losses and Damages
Climate-related risks considered in the Loss and Damage discussion are associated
with sudden-onset extreme events, such as flooding and cyclones, and slow-onset
impacts including sea level rise and melting glaciers (see Fig. 4.1).
Timescale: hours days weeks months years decades
Examples: landslides, storms, floods... droughts sea level rise, glacier shrinkage
Sudden-onset events
shocks
Slow-onset processes
gradual changes increasing stress
Fig. 4.1 Characterisation of climate-related risks relevant for Loss&Damage. Based on Huggel
et al. (2016). Pictures Source Wikimedia Commons
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Table 4.1 Classifying loss and damage
Avoided Unavoided Unavoidable
Avoidable loss and damage
that can and will be avoided by
climate change mitigation
and/or adaptation measures
Avoidable loss and damage
that will not be addressed by
further mitigation and/or
adaption measures, even
though the avoidance would be
possible. Financial, technical
and political constraints as
well as case-specific risk
preferences narrow down the
adaptation space
Loss and damage that cannot
be avoided through further
mitigation and/or adaptation
measures, e.g. loss and
damage due to slow onset
processes that have kicked-off
already, such as sea level rise,
and extreme event risk where
no adaptation efforts would
help preventing the physical
impacts
Source Table based on Verheyen and Roderick (2008)
While there is no official definition, losses in this context have been associated
with irreversibility, e.g. fatalities from disasters or households stuck in poverty traps
post-event, while damages have been referred to as impacts that can be rectified in
principle. A useful distinction made that we build on has been between avoided,
unavoided and unavoidable loss and damage (Verheyen and Roderick 2008) (see
Table 4.1). In the literature, this same distinction has also been discussed with regard
to whether climate-related impacts cannot or will not be addressed by mitigation or
adaptation (cf. Mace and Verheyen 2016).
An example for unavoidable impacts or loss and damage that cannot be addressed
either by mitigation or adaptation are extreme event risks where no adaptation efforts
would help preventing the physical damage (Verheyen and Roderick 2008). A rea-
son that some adaptation measures will not be taken or losses and damages remain
unavoided is that actors may be subject to socio-economic constraints, especially
international financing, and/or implementation constraints, although at least in the-
ory these measures could have been taken (Chambwera and Mohammed 2014).
Further constraints to adaptation planning and implementation comprise a lack of
technological or knowledge resources and institutional characteristics that impede
action.
4.2.1 Risk Identification: Analytics for Defining Avoidable
and Unavoidable Losses and Damages
Over the last few years, with consequences of climate change becoming visible on
all continents and in all oceans (IPCC 2014), assessments of climate change impacts
have changed in focus from an initial analysis of the problem to the assessment
of actual observed and potential future impacts, and finally, to the consideration
of specific risk analytical methods to assess and manage future increases in risks.
Originally focussed on incremental risk induced by anthropogenic climate change
to identify dangerous levels of global risk (IPCC’s five reasons for concerns), a risk
perspective has prominently gained traction in recent IPCC reportswhere climate risk
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at different scales has been considered to be both shaped by natural climate variability
and climate change, as well as by socioeconomic exposure and vulnerability. This
evolved framing has opened doors for considering DRR as an important part of
climate adaptation and lead to novel considerations organised aroundCRM, involving
themanagement of total climate-related risk including any current adaptation deficits
(Jones et al. 2014).
To inform thinking and action on CRM, a sort of ‘climate risk language’ has been
developed by IPCC’s working group II in its 5th assessment report (IPCC 2014). In
doing so, working group II has built on IPCC’s multiple lines of evidence philoso-
phy, including collating empirical evidence on impacts and risks with information
on adaptation options, and the modelling of future risks, as well as using expert
judgment. The IPCC report succinctly summarises climate risks and the potential
(as well as the limits) for adaptation for key risks and three time steps (present, near-
and long-term 2 and 4 °C).
While adaptation constraints or barriers are defined as “factors that make it harder
to plan and implement adaptation actions,” an adaptation limit is “the point at which
an actor’s objectives or system’s needs cannot be secured from intolerable risks
through adaptive actions.” (Klein et al. 2014) Furthermore, soft and hard limits
to adaptation can be distinguished. The latter concept describes limits where no
adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks, while in the former concept
adaptive actionmight be possible in the future but nomeasures are currently available
(IPCC 2014). The distinction between barriers and limits to adaptation as well as
between soft and hard limits is coherent in theory, yet many difficulties might arise
in operationalising it in practice. What determines when a limit is breached and
who decides what the limits are? For example, Fig. 4.2 visualizes risks from sea
level rise and high-water events as well as the corresponding adaptation potential in
Small Island States. Building on the identification of key hazard drivers, sea level rise
and cyclones interacting with high tide events, it finds the level of risk, essentially
for coastal flooding, to currently be at medium levels and increasing with future
warming to very high levels, particularly for the 4 °C warming scenario. While the
risk bar, which is the product of the IPCCC’s meta-analysis of available literature on
climate-related risks in SIDS, shows overall risk (given adaptation actions taken),
this visualization also teases out the potential for additional adaptation efforts in
terms of further reducing risk.
IPCC’s analysis applied to key world regions shows that the potential for adapta-
tion is large for many regions and suggests that many risks are avoidable (although
actions are not yet fully implemented thus defining a soft adaptation limit). Yet, for
some regions and risks (particularly in natural systems) and at higher levels of warm-
ing, limits to adaptation are found to be reached, and these climate-related risks may
become unavoidable (see chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Haque et al. 2018;
van der Geest et al. 2018; Landauer and Juhola 2018). An example is the bleaching
of tropical coral reefs beyond 1.5/2 and 4 °C, where no options for adaptation exist
(hence defining a hard limit to adaptation) (Magrin et al. 2014).
4 The Risk and Policy Space for Loss and Damage … 89
F
ig
.4
.2
Se
le
ct
ed
ke
y
ri
sk
s
an
d
po
te
nt
ia
lf
or
ad
ap
ta
tio
n
fo
r
sm
al
li
sl
an
ds
.
So
ur
ce
N
ur
se
et
al
.(
20
14
),
p.
16
35
90 T. Schinko et al.
4.2.2 Climate Attribution of Unavoidable Losses
and Damages: Establishing a Role for Climate Justice
Ethical considerations in the form of questions regarding justice and fairness have
played a key role in the policy and academic discourse on climate change (see e.g.
Brown et al. 2006; Gardiner 2004a, b, 2006; Jamieson 1992, 2001, 2005; Ott 2004;
Posner and Weisbach 2010; Shue 1992, 1993, 1999; Singer 2002, 2006; Vander-
heiden 2008; chapter by Wallimann-Helmer 2018) ever since the beginning of the
UNFCCC process, prominently exemplified by the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities in the Rio Declaration (United Nations 1992, Article 3.1).
For climate change mitigation and adaptation the discourse has largely circled
around distributive justice (Grasso 2007; Posner and Weisbach 2010). In the mitiga-
tion domain different principles of distributive justice, applicable to the sharing of
mitigation burdens have been discussed (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009; Vanderhei-
den 2008). Due to inertia in the climatic system, no matter how effective global GHG
mitigation efforts turn out to be, humanity will be faced with risks due to climate
change that have direct and indirect (e.g. through ecosystem services) impacts on
human welfare and which will require substantial adaptation efforts (IPCC 2012,
2014). The justice debate in the adaptation domain has thus centred on the question
of how the costs (and benefits) of adaption should be distributed across countries
(Adger et al. 2006; Dellink et al. 2009; Paavola and Adger 2006).
With the L&D debate, another notion of climate justice has now formally entered
the international climate policy scene: compensatory justice. Basically two kinds of
justice are especially applicable in the context of L&D (see chapter by Wallimann-
Helmer et al. 2018). Forward-looking contexts are concerned with distributive jus-
tice, especially when distributing the risks of damages that cannot be adapted to.
Backward-looking contexts are concerned with compensatory justice, especially in
legal or procedural attributions of responsibility and liability. Compensatory justice
suggests that it is those agents who primarily caused climate change who should
compensate the agents which are experiencing losses and damages due to climate
change without having substantially contributed to the problem themselves. This in
turn implies that the agents who are not responsible for climate change are given a
right for compensation by the agents who are found responsible and hence liable for
particular risks that climate change increases the likelihood for (i.e. the outcome).
Distributive justice (based on the ability to pay principle) suggests that it is those
agents who are able or have the capacity to pay for managing residual risks should
bear the lion’s share of the costs, and those agents in greatest need for financial
assistance should be allocated the bulk of the benefits, i.e. the resources globally
available.
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The IPCC has attributed trends in slow onset climate change processes and many
climate extremes to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2012). More-
over, climate model results evaluated in the latest IPCC report show peak windstorm
velocity of tropical storms is set to increase, rainfall to become more volatile and sea
levels to rise as ice caps melt, altogether leading to even more severe adverse impacts
of climate change in the future (IPCC 2013). These findings imply an explicit and
moral obligation for enhanced action on managing climate-related risks. Different
principles of distributive justice, such as capacity to pay or greatest needs, may be
applied to share the associated costs among agents, a principle which indeed the
international community has built on as it supports the most vulnerable countries1
(Posner and Weisbach 2010). In addition, climate change also brings along a need
for considering issues of compensatory justice due to the unequal distribution of
historical and current emissions as the root cause of global warming, the adverse
distribution of impacts of climate change between the global North and the global
South, and the fact that climate change is projected to lead to unavoidable and poten-
tially irrecoverable losses and damages, such as of low-lying islands in the wake of
strong sea-level rise (Roser et al. 2015).
Climate science has been making great progress in climate attribution research
evenwith regard to specific events (see chapter by James et al. 2018). Recent research
has shown a significant human element in mega events (Trenberth et al. 2015) such
as superstorms Sandy in 2013 in the US, the Australian heatwave in 2013 (Herring
et al. 2014), the 2016 drought in Kenia (WWA 2017). Mann et al. (2017) found
that amplified arctic warming, influenced by climate change, makes temperature
patterns (so called “planetary waves”) that cause heatwaves, droughts and floods
across Europe, North America and Asia more likely. Yet, causally linking anthro-
pogenic emissions to extreme weather events and eventually to risks on people and
property has not conclusively been achieved and will remain complex, as risks from
climate-related events are shaped by many factors, including climate variability, ris-
ing exposure of people and assets as well as socio-economic vulnerability dynamics
(Stone et al. 2013). While basic evidence to link anthropogenic GHG emissions to
climate impacts is there (Schaller et al. 2016), making the concrete, enforceable case
will remain much harder (Huggel et al. 2015; chapter by Bouwer 2018). Hence, and
as argued above, the causal attribution and strict liability principle cannot be invoked
currently (e.g. for legal action). Nevertheless, we suggest it is kept in the background,
when decisions are made in the meanwhile based on principles of distributive justice.
In the medium to longer-term, as evidence from climate change attribution studies
potentially increases, we argue for a gradual integration of the compensatory justice
dimension.
1Current international support for the most vulnerable countries is primarily based on implied
responsibility and moral duty, as well as humanitarian reasons. Donor countries are currently not
acting on explicit responsibilities.
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To this effect, again, IPCC is the scientific authority with its methodological
framework for detection and attribution. This systematic approach first focusses on
detecting any trend in changes of key variables, then seeks to attribute those to climate
change (e.g. change in local temperature and other system variables) (Cramer et al.
2014). As one example, Fig. 4.3 shows a summary application of the framework in
terms of specifying the degree of confidence in the detection of observed impacts
of climate change versus the degree of confidence in attribution to climate change
drivers for tropical small islands. While, for example, it finds for “greater rates
of sea level rise relative to global means” (a coastal system impact) both very high
confidence levels of detection and attribution, it detects trends at very high confidence
levels for tightly associated impacts in human systems (environmental degradation
and casualties), albeit only at low levels of confidence, as risks in human systems
are importantly shaped by socio-economic vulnerability and exposure.
4.2.3 Risk Evaluation: Considering Risk Preference and Risk
Tolerance for Identifying Soft and Hard Adaptation
Limits
Establishing risk as the overarching concept and metric naturally leads to addressing
the question of risk coping or risk preference. While risk identification assesses risks
in monetary and/or non-monetary terms, risk evaluation, involving socioeconomic
analysis, leads to the notion of risk preference and risk tolerance. The process of
risk evaluation examines agents’ (households, private and public sectors) ability to
respond to risk, also termed risk tolerance. Economics has distinguished risk prefer-
ence around risk aversion, neutrality and risk loving (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005). Risk
analysis, e.g. Dow et al. (2013), building on Klinke and Renn (2002), conceptu-
ally break risk tolerance down into acceptable—no formal risk reduction interven-
tions necessary; tolerable—risk reduction measures are necessary and implemented
depending on resources available; and intolerable risks-risk cannot be taken on, i.e.
action is required irrespective of costs but often no further action is possible, thus
essentially defining risks that exceed the limits of adaptation (see Fig. 4.4).
Following such framing, one could argue that, backed up by considerable evidence
(UNFCCC 2015b) as well as heuristics, the intolerable risk space (globally) with
regard to ‘dangerous interference with the climate system,’ as put down in Article
2 of the UNFCCC, has been determined by the Paris agreement as starting beyond
1.5 °C of average global warming. The 1.5 °C line is a political compromise based on
intense negotiations and normative discourse, which was informed by science. It is
not a ‘hard’ system boundary and already today, with good levels of confidence, the
IPCChas identifiedmany communities and countries as facing substantial stress from
climate change-exacerbated impacts on agriculture in Africa (high confidence), sea
surge in small islands states (high confidence) and riverine flooding in Bangladesh
(medium confidence) (IPCC 2014).
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Fig. 4.4 Framing risk acceptance and (in)tolerance. Source Klinke and Renn (2002)
Eventually, what constitutes acceptable, tolerable, and intolerable risk can be
defined in a subjective/normative or technical/science-based way. Risk tolerance is
strongly determined by social, cultural, and economic factors and often requires sub-
jective judgment (Dowet al. 2013). The IPCCWorkingGroup II in 2014, for example,
used expert judgement for determining levels of low, medium and high risk in its
regional risk assessments. On the other hand, risk analysis has developed analytical
procedures for segregating risk according to differential ability to bear risk to which
risk policy instruments can be tailored to - termed risk layering (Mechler et al. 2014).
4.3 An Actionable Framework for Outlining the Risk
and Policy Options Space for Loss and Damage
Overall, we argue for a practical and dynamic policy approach to the L&D debate
based on the concept of comprehensive CRM and balancing the ethical principles of
compensatory justice and distributive justice (see also Dellink et al. 2009, discussing
a similar approach for the case of CCA). Figure 4.5 conceptualizes a dynamic needs
and liability-basedCRMapproach to theL&Ddebate. It summarizes the twodifferent
notions of justice (compensatory and distributive) as linked to the different political
principles (capacity andneeds, liability and rights) onwhich policies tackling residual
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Political principles
Funders
Capacity
Recipients
Needs
Funders
Liability
Recipients
Rights
Policy & Implementation Needs & liability-basedClimate Risk Management
Implementation horizon Short to medium term Medium to long term
Notion of justice Distributive justice Compensatory justice
Analytical perspective Forward looking Backward looking
Fig. 4.5 Elements of the dynamic principled approach to Loss and Damage. Source Own Figure
risks in the domain of L&D are based. Given the present difficulties of attributing
climate related losses and damages to (1) anthropogenic climate change and further
(2) to certain agents, we propose taking on a distributive justice perspective for the
short to medium-term. We argue for supporting comprehensive CRM based on the
capacity to pay principle in those countries with the greatest need, identified, e.g. by
a country level risk assessment based on risk layering (such as presented in Sect. 4.4),
and focusing on both national and local levels.
Particularly in the medium to longer-term, as evidence from climate change attri-
bution studies is bound to increase, we see a strong consideration of a compensatory
justice dimension into the practical policy approach, by taking on (in addition) a
liability-based perspective. This is important given the evidence on climate impacts
and the fact that compensation will remain a central normative aspect in the climate
negotiations and has to be dealt with in order to establish healthy long-term inter-
national relations, which themselves are a precondition for implementing just and
effective responses to global climate change (Thompson and Otto 2015).
Naturally, the question emerges whether and how the three building blocks—risk
identification, risk evaluation, and climate attribution and justice–which have been
discussed in the previous section, can now be brought together and how to fill the
principled approach outlined here with life to identify and visualise the Loss and
Damage space? Our discussion builds on the policy proposal made by Mechler and
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Schinko (2016) that considers key contributions from these fields of research and
synthesizes respective insights into a visual representation of, what we consider,
constitutes the risk and policy space for Loss and Damage.
4.3.1 The Loss and Damage Risk and Options Space
Synthesising existing literature, in particular building on IPCC assessments and the
UNFCCC stocktake that led to defining the Paris ambition of 1.5 °C respectively
2 °C of change as the upper global warming limit (UNFCCC 2015b), the summary
chart (Fig. 4.6) shows stylised past, present, and future climate-related risk levels and
corresponding CRM portfolios for a given community or country (here again shown
via the example of the Small Island States, whose risk profile has been presented
in Fig. 4.2) facing severe climate risk today and expecting further increases in risk
due to climate change (the socio-economic component is kept constant for ease
of presentation, which does not affect our argumentation). In line with the three
cornerstones presented above, the key foci are to (i) consider total climate-related
risk incl. the adaptation deficit, (ii) include risk preference in terms of acceptable,
tolerable and intolerable risk, (iii) consider risk of irreversible loss.
The options portfolio comprises actual and potential cumulative action in terms
of CRM, implemented as part of separate or synergistic efforts related to DRR and
climate adaptation. It is important to note here that while IPCC (2012) highlights the
need to look at all drivers of risk and to synergisticallymanage those, in the context of
climate anthropogenic climate change is at the centre of interest. The IPCC (2012)
has suggested that “Effective climate risk management portfolios integrate sound
risk analysis, risk reduction, risk financing, response and opportunities for learning.”
(see also chapter by Lopez et al. 2018; chapter by Botzen et al. 2018). How can those
concepts be further operationalised at scale? As one example, Box 4.1 presents a
comprehensive CRM framework developed for the case of informing Indian state
and national-level policymakers, which may act as a blueprint for taking action on
climate-related losses and damages.
Comprehensive risk management and policy can be broken down to comprise
incremental (e.g., raising dikes), fundamental (e.g., floodplains instead of dikes)
and transformative (e.g., voluntary migration from floodplains) interventions (see
also Mechler and Schinko 2016). Accepting this stylised visualisation (Fig. 4.6), the
options space for Loss and Damage may be determined as follows: (i) with climate
change amplifying risk, there is a legitimate case for international action in the Loss
andDamage transformative risk space to push risk down from intolerable to tolerable
levels complementing the DRR and adaptation policy domains; (ii) the Loss and
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Fig. 4.6 Identifying the risk and policy options space for Loss and Damage. Source Own Figure
based on Mechler and Schinko (2016)
Damage curative space opens upwhen technical and feasible risk reduction becomes
limited over time with risk increasing, e.g. sea level rise leading to irreversible and
unavoidable loss of land and induced migration, limiting the societally negotiated
pathway, and foreclosing development opportunities (people being pushed tomigrate
from their homelands).
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Box 4.1 A Climate Risk Management (CRM) framework for India
On behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
the German development assistance agency GIZ with partners developed a CRM framework that
can be utilised to assess climate-related risks and identify management measures at various scales.
In close cooperation with IIASA, KPMG and IIT Delhi, a six step process operationalising the
CRM process at scale was developed (Fig. 4.7). The CRM process is embedded in a learning
framework, which allows for updating decisions over time with mounting evidence and insights.
Traditional DRR and CCA policy typically operates via incremental adjustments to existing man-
agement approaches. While such incremental learning is important in the short term, climate-
related (residual) risks require a particular focus on locally-applicable bottom-up techniques for
understanding risks and risk management interventions. Such techniques are, for example, Vulner-
ability Capacity Assessments (VCAs) and community-led focus groups. In the face of financial,
technical and institutional constraints, fundamental and transformative learning is needed. These
advanced learning loops aim at achieving the required adjustments of management processes at
national and subnational levels in order to be able to deal with increasing risk over time.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:
Triple-loop
learning:
(1) Incremental
(2) Fundamental
(3) Transformational
Evaluate risk tolerance and
limits — Conduct risk 
segregation into acceptable, 
tolerable and intolerable
Identify risk— Conduct a 
qualitative and quantitative 
risk assessment
Develop context specific 
methodology to assess 
risk of the system of 
interest
Identify system of 
interest (sector, region) —
Conduct hotspot and
capacity analysis
Identify and assess feasible
options to avert, minimize 
and address climate-related
residual risk
Status quo — Assess the
information needs and
objectives of the overall
CRM framework
Tolerance
Transformative
Fundamental
Incremental
Fig. 4.7 Climate riskmanagement (CRM) six step approach. SourceGIZ et al. (2018 unpublished)
An exemplary application of the comprehensive framework to Tamil Nadu in India (cyclone
and flood risk) served to test the methodological approach and glean its usefulness at state and
local levels. The application showed that risks are on the rise due to climate and socio-economic
drivers, and that risks are significantly affecting key objectives of households and the public
sector. Furthermore, risk responses by farmers and households are largely of incremental, yet
increasingly also of fundamental and importantly transformative nature. Governmental DRR and
CCA institutions work well within their remit to provide incremental assistance, yet are usually
not charged to deal with fundamental and transformative interventions. The assessment revealed
that the risk management policy options space needs more attention and further deliberation with
those at risk and in charge to deploy interventions with public support from state, national to
international levels.
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Transformative Measures
With sea level rise alone threatening to displace 72–187 million people by 2100
(Nicholls et al. 2011), transformative measures are increasingly needed, such as
offering alternative livelihoods (e.g., switching from smallholder farming in coastal
areas to services in cities) and assisting with voluntary migration, as compared with
curative support for forced migration, which we discuss below (se also Mechler and
Schinko 2016). Hino et al. (2017) find thatmanaged retreat—“the strategic relocation
of structures or abandonment of land”—is a potentially important transformational
option when limits to structural protection or other adaptation measures to manage
climate-related risks are reached. It is important to note that even though consid-
ered transformational, managed retreat is confronted by its own set of case-specific
complexities and challenges, whether political, social, or legal (Hino et al. 2017).
Curative Measures
The space for curative measures is much less clear, and has not seen a lot of attention
owing to the fact that it overlaps largely with demands for compensation, which
have been ruled out from the Paris agreement, and because of existing limitations in
the causal attribution of losses and damages from slow-onset processes and sudden-
onset extreme events to anthropogenic climate change. The most advanced ideas in
the context of curative measures have been articulated with regard to support for
involuntary climate-induced displacement and forced migration. A climate displace-
ment facility is being discussed under the WIM and proposals for approaches to deal
with climate-induced displacement have been made, such as the Nansen Principles
on Climate Change and Displacement (Nansen Conference 2011), and the Peninsula
Principles on Climate Displacement Within States (Displacement Solutions 2015).
Yet, concrete ideas for operationalisation are largely lacking.
For the contested discourse around international compensation for climate-related
impacts exacerbated by climate change, only few concrete options have been put on
the table so far. Sprinz and Bünau (2013), for example, find that no convincing mech-
anism has yet been found to compensate for climate-related impacts. The authors
present a conceptual outline for a voluntary, internationally organized compensa-
tion fund and highlight the need for specialized, independent climate courts. At the
national level, however, the establishment of national mechanisms to address climate
induced losses and damages is being discussed, e.g. for Bangladesh. The chapter by
Haque et al. (2018) suggests to make use of a reserve fund of approximately USD
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140 million accumulated by unspent finance from the Bangladesh Climate Change
Trust Fund in order to deal with those climate-related impacts not tackled by con-
ventional DRR or CCAmeasures. This would also include ex-post compensation for
losses and damages triggered by climate change induced slow onset events, salinity
intrusion and increased intensity of cyclones.
4.4 Identifying the Space for Loss and Damage:
An Application
Science can provide insights into defining the Loss and Damage risk space and
associated policy response options. As indicated by the list of building blocks for
a framework outlined above and also demonstrated by other chapters in this vol-
ume (see particularly chapters by Lopez et al. 2018; Botzen et al. 2018; Serdeczny
2018), science for L&D has to essentially be transdisciplinary and multifaceted. This
requires input by, among others, climatology, meteorology, ethics and philosophy,
geography, risk science and social sciences including economics. We proceed with
an application building on transdisciplinary analysis and focused on one aspect,
identifying fiscal risk tolerance with respect to managing climate-related extreme
events.
4.4.1 From Risk Identification to Risk Evaluation: Risk
Layering and Risk Tolerance
Climate risk assessments generally go through a structured process, starting with
the identification of risks based on qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Risk
identification is then followed by risk evaluation for determining risk tolerance, as the
next step in the structured process, which, again, can build on various methods, such
as eliciting stated risk preferences via focus groups, studying behaviour in markets
to reveal preference, or use risk and economic modelling. Box 4.2 reports on the
political decision-making process for defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for
accident risks in Switzerland. Risk analytics has provided the scientific basis for the
political decision in that case, but has tended to only matter up to a certain point.
After all, the delimiters of acceptable to not acceptable risk areas have mostly been
determined by the political process.
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Box 4.2 Defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for accident risks in Switzer-
land
This example distinguishes different levels of accident risk acceptance as specified in
the Swiss Industrial Accident Regulation, building on various inputs and procedures.
The acceptable risk area demarcated in green and aggregating small risks (low extent
of damage) is defined and regulated by specifications made in the Swiss Labour Act.
Beyond the transition zone (marked in yellow), risks are considered not acceptable
(catastrophic, large-scale accidents) and identified in red. Here it is the (national-level)
political decision-making process, building on analytics, but also other inputs, that
determine risk areas as (non) acceptable, thus putting emphasis on rolling out a proper
democratically-legitimated process for managing risks and appropriate risk manage-
ment actions.
Fig. 4.8 Defining acceptable and unacceptable risks for accident risks in Switzerland.
Source WBGU (1998)
As one promising analytical component of aCRMapproach, the concept and prac-
tice of risk layering has seen increasing attention (Mechler et al. 2014; Mechler and
Schinko 2016; Schinko and Mechler 2016). Risk layering involves segmenting risk
into acceptable, tolerable and intolerable layers and allocating roles and responsibil-
ities to reduce, finance or accept risks. We suggest to build on risk analytics in terms
of a risk portfolio approach that breaks down total risk (as determined by probability
and impacts/losses) into 4 distinct layers: (i) a layer for frequent risks for action on
risk reduction, (ii) a medium layer of risks, where risk reduction will be combined
with insurance and other risk-financing instruments that transfer residual risk; (iii)
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Fig. 4.9 Conceptualising risk layering. Source Based on Mechler et al. (2014)
a layer for infrequent catastrophic events, where public and international assistance
is decisive, and (iv) a very rare, high risk layer, which will require assistance from
international climate funding sources (see Fig. 4.9).
We argue that risk layering can be a valuable tool to define the Loss and Damage
risk and options space for economic or market-based losses and damages, which can
be quantified and costed. Employing a climate risk lens, a focus on loss distributions
is appropriate as it provides information on the whole risk spectrum and not only on
expected or average losses. Average annual (or expected) losses may differ greatly
compared to potential losses of low probability events, e.g. for Bangladesh average
losses associated with cyclone hazard are estimated to be around 0.5 billion USD,
while a 500 year event is gauged to cause losses 40 times higher (UNISDR 2015).
In addition, the risk layering approach can help determine the increase or decrease
of climate-related risks, and disentangle the increase according to the underlying
drivers of risk—hazard, exposure and vulnerability. This has important implications
for the prioritisation of instruments within the options space.
As one example, Fig. 4.10 provides results from an application of the risk layering
approach to the fiscal implications of flood risk in Bangladesh, the dominant climate-
related risk in the country (based on Mechler et al. 2014; Mechler and Bouwer
2015; Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2016) (for a more detailed discussion of the case of
Bangladesh see the chapter by Haque et al. 2018). The quantitative risk assessment
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Fig. 4.10 Understanding
risk and risk layering for the
case of flood risk in
Bangladesh. Note The
different colours represent
acceptable, tolerable and
intolerable risk layers
ranging from high
probability, low impact
events (1 year) to low
probability, high impact
events (100 years). Source
Adapted from Mechler et al.
(2014)
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carried outwith the IIASACATSIMmodel (seeHochrainer-Stigler et al. 2014) builds
onhydrological and socio-economicmodelling and estimates increasingflood risk for
1 to 100 year events for present, 2020 to 2050 periods. A 100 year event today would
cost about USD 4.7 billion, and increase in 2050 to more than USD 20 billion absent
additional risk management measures. Much of the burden (infrastructure losses and
support for households and business) generally may end up with the public sector
and we find fiscal risk tolerance, determined by the country’s capacity to absorb risk
by national means and international assistance, is already today exceeded at events
with a return period of less than 25 years (the area shaded in red). This fiscal risk
threshold is expected to move down to even lower return periods over time and the
costs are estimated to strongly increase, forwhichnational (the planned compensation
fund) and international funding will be required to pick up the burden. Risk layering
thus not only helps to identify appropriate measures for tackling different layers of
climate-related risk, but also provides an opportunity to investigate how risk layers
will change in the future andwhat portions of riskmay eventually become intolerable.
The logic of risk layering can be expanded to global analysis, which may be used
to identify countries that are in need of international support for transformative and
curative CRMmeasures. Figure 4.11 shows results from such an exercise identifying
fiscal risk tolerance as the gap return period in financial resources available. Countries
shaded in red face such instances of fiscal intolerance at particularly low return period
events.
The fiscal risk evaluation methodology, while only covering certain aspects of the
problem, enables analysts to determine global funding arrangements to support coun-
tries that face risks beyond their financial tolerance and may assist the international
community in prioritising investment decisions with regard to transformative and
curative CRM measures. Such a fund may build on available sovereign risk pooling
arrangements in the Caribbean, Pacific, Africa and the Indian oceans (see chapters
by Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018 and Schaefer et al. 2018).
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Fig. 4.11 Global map identifying high-level risks. Note The lower the return period the higher are
the chances of a gap event. Source Based on Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014)
Overall, a risk-layering plus risk tolerance-based approach supports the integrated
assessment of risk portfolios across global to country, down to local levels—a fea-
ture that is beneficial especially in the context of identifying the Loss and Damage
risk space and corresponding implementation measures. As mentioned throughout,
decision makers, communities or societies will differ in their understanding of what
constitutes acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risk. Thus, risk layers will differ
according to decisions at stake, context, and stakeholders involved.
4.5 Implications for Research and Policy
The L&D debate has been contested among those advocating compensation for
actual losses and damages, versus those that have been suggesting support should
be extended for tackling potential losses and damages, most prominently as part
of further employing disaster risk management and climate insurance applications.
Our discussion proposed an actionable way forward for the deliberations based on
a broad interpretation and conceptualisation of comprehensive CRM, importantly
aligning and balancing notions of distributive and compensatory justice. The sug-
gested approach involves in a short-medium term, needs-based perspective, support
for risk management actions, which fall beyond countries’ ability to prevent and
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absorb risk; these actions to be supported internationally would largely comprise
of fundamental and transformative risk management interventions. Particularly in
a medium-longer term liability-based perspective, we emphasise consideration for
liabilities attributable to climate change. As we suggest, these considerations can be
integrated into a policy-oriented framework, which identifies the policy space for
Loss and Damage as composed of curative and transformative measures.
Transformative measures exhibit substantial overlap with DRR and adaptation
agendas, yet focus on high-level risks. This set ofmeasures is seeing attention,mostly
focussed on climate insurance (e.g. the G7 Initiative; GIZ 2015; Schäfer et al. 2018).
Many analysts and advocates, however, see a need for broadening this debate towards
comprehensive CRM, so that risk prevention and preparedness are better integrated
and linked with risk financing. The curative action space is less clearly defined, while
heavily contested. Beyond the calls for compensation for actual losses and damages,
which are currently ruled out in the Paris agreement, the set-up of and support for a
climate displacement facility has been in the spotlight and may qualify as an action
item in this space.
Common to both sets of measures, and discussed as a working element of the
agenda, is a need for committing finance for the genuine implementation of the
WIM. Such commitments to finance may have a prospective and transformative
function in terms of financial support for CRM, encompassing financing for climate
insurance premium subsidies, reserve capital and technical assistance. The curative
function involves finance for dealing ex-post with unavoided and unavoidable loss
and damage, on top of mechanisms that deal with avoidable risk. An important
aspect to emphasise is that our proposed principled approach, ideally to be linked
to international commitments to support, can serve as a sort of “canary in the coal
mine” where risks, costs and implications detected now and modelled for later time
horizons at local to regional risk management scales can help to inform the ultimate
remit of the UNFCCC, which is to harness collective global action for “avoiding
dangerous interference with the climate system” (United Nations 1992).
There is analytical and modelling expertise that can be employed to identify risks
‘beyond adaptation’ and to define the Loss and Damage risk and options space. We
argued that risk layering can be a valuable tool—at least for market-based losses
and damages. Non-economic or non-market based impacts may require alternative
assessment tools. When taking a climate risk lens, probabilistic loss distributions
are useful to provide information about the whole risk spectrum beyond expected
or average losses only. The risk layering approach can also provide support for
determining any increase (or decrease) of climate-related risks, and disentangle the
contributing drivers of risk—hazard, exposure and vulnerability, which has important
consequences for the prioritisation of instruments within the options space. It is
important to note, however, that disentangling anthropogenic and natural drivers of
risk is still not conclusively possible.
Our application of a risk analytical approach, comprising risk layering and risk-
based probabilistic modelling to the case of flood risk in Bangladesh and at the global
level represents amethodological approach for determining countries’ financial needs
for dealing with intolerable risk layers. Notwithstanding the fact that our example
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dealt with monetary losses, we hold that, with many aspects of being of immaterial
nature, our broad risk and justice approach, with a different set of methods and tools,
is also applicable to issues such as migration and preservation of cultural heritage.
Such and other assessments at national as well as at regional and global scales may
provide the basis for tackling the salient follow-up question towards the genuine
implementation of theWIM around justice aspects: whowill provide (receive) which
share of the required levels of financial support, and based on which burden-sharing
principle? After all, if any of the options discussed here and as part of the WIM
process are to see acceptance and implementation, they need strong embedding in a
framework based on principles of justice.
References
AdgerWN, Huq S, Paavola J, MaceMJ (2006) Fairness in adaptation to climate change. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA
Botzen W, Bouwer LM, Scussolini P, Kuik O, Haasnoot M, Lawrence J, Aerts JCJH (2018) Inte-
grated disaster risk management and adaptation. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski
S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy
options. Springer, Cham, pp 287–315
Bouwer LM (2018) Observed and projected impacts from extreme weather events: implications for
loss and damage. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds)
Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham,
place, pp 63–82
Brown D, Lemons J, Tuana N (2006) The importance of expressly integrating ethical analysis into
climate change policy formation. Clim Policy 5(5):549–552
Calliari E, Surminski S, Mysiak J (2018) The politics of (and behind) the UNFCCC’s loss and
damage mechanism. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J
(eds) Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer,
Cham, pp 155–178
Chambwera M, Mohammed K (2014) 7. Economic analysis of a community-based adaptation
project in Sudan. In: Ensor J, Berger R, Huq S (eds) Community-based adaptation to climate
change. Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, Warwickshire, United Kingdom, pp 111–128
Cramer W, Yohe GW, Auffhammer M, Huggel C, Molau U, Silva Dias MAF, Solow A, Stone DA,
Tibig L (2014) Detection and attribution of observed impacts. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken
DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC,
Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change
2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. contribution
of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel of climate
change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp
979–1037
Dellink R, den Elzen M, Aiking H, Bergsma E, Berkhout F, Dekker T, Gupta J (2009) Sharing the
burden of financing adaptation to climate change. Glob Environ Change 19(4):411–421
Displacement Solutions (2015) Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States (Aug.
19, 2015). http://displacementsolutions.org/peninsula-principles/. Accessed 11 Oct 2017
DowK, Berkhout F, Preston B, Klein R, Midgley G, ShawM (2013) Limits to adaptation. Nat Clim
Change 3:305–307
Eeckhoudt L, Gollier C, Schlesinger H (2005) Economic and financial decisions under risk. Prince-
ton University Press
Gardiner S (2004a) Ethics and global climate change. Ethics 114:555–600
4 The Risk and Policy Space for Loss and Damage … 107
Gardiner S (2004b) The global warming tragedy and the dangerous illusion of the Kyoto Protocol.
Ethics Int Aff 18(1):23–39
Gardiner S (2006) A perfect moral storm. Environ Values 15(3):397–413
GIZ (2015) Climate risk insurance for strengthening climate resilience of poor people in vulnerable
countries. GIZ, Eschborn
GIZ, IIASA, KPMG India (2018) Climate Risk Management (CRM) Framework for India. GIZ
Grasso M (2007) A normative ethical framework in climate change. Clim Change 81(3):223–246
Handmer J, Nalau J (2018)Understanding loss and damage in Pacific Small Island developing states.
In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage
from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp 365–381
HaqueM, PervinM, Sultana S, Huq S (2018) Towards establishing a national mechanism to address
loss and damage: a case study from Bangladesh. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski
S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy
options. Springer, Cham, pp 451–473
Herring S et al (eds) (2014) Special supplement to the bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society 95
Hino M, Field CB, Mach KJ (2017) Managed retreat as a response to natural hazard risk. Nat Clim
Change 7:828–832. https://doi.org/10.1038/NCLIMATE3252
Hochrainer-Stigler S,Mechler R, PflugGC,WilligesK (2014) Funding public adaptation to climate-
related disasters. Estimates for a global fund. Glob Environ Change 25:87–96. https://doi.org/1
0.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.011
Hochrainer-Stigler S, Mochizuki J, Pflug G (2016) Impacts of global and climate change uncer-
tainties for disaster risk projections: a case study on rainfall-induced flood risk in Bangladesh. J
Extreme Events 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1142/s2345737616500044
Huggel C, Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Wallimann-Helmer I (2016) Science
for loss and damage. Four research contributions to science for loss and damage. Four research
contributions to the debate. Working paper by the loss and damage network, prepared for COP22
in Marrakech. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/LD-Forum-
paper-COP-22-final.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2017
Huggel C, Stone D, Eicken H, Hansen G (2015) Potential and limitations of the attribution of
climate change impacts for informing loss and damage discussions and policies. Clim Change
133:453–467
IPCC (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adapta-
tion. In: Field CB, Barros V, Stocker TF, Qin D, Dokken DJ, Ebi KL, MastrandreaMD,Mach KJ,
Plattner G-K, Allen SK, Tignor M, Midgley PM (eds) A special report of working groups I and
II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pp
IPCC (2013) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K,
Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Contribution of
working group I to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pp
IPCC(2014)Climate change2014: impacts, adaptation, andvulnerability. PartA: global and sectoral
aspects. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee
M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastran-
drea PR, White LL (eds) Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the
intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pp
James RA, Jones RG, Boyd E, Young HR, Otto FEL, Huggel C, Fuglestvedt JS (2018) Attribution:
how is it relevant for loss and damage policy and practice? In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T,
Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods
and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp 113–154
Jamieson D (1992) Ethics, public policy and global warming. Sci Technol Human Values
17(2):139–153
108 T. Schinko et al.
Jamieson D (2001) Climate change and global environmental justice. In: Miller C, Edwards P
(eds) Changing the atmosphere: expert knowledge and environmental governance. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, pp 287–307
Jamieson D (2005) Adaptation, mitigation and justice. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W, Howarth R (eds)
Perspectives on climate change: science, economics, politics, ethics, vol 5. Elsevier, Amsterdam,
pp 217–248
Jones R, Patwardhan A, Cohen S, Dessai S, Lammel A, Lempert R, Mirza M, von Storch H (2014)
Foundations for decision making. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea
MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN,
MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group II to the fifth
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel of climate change. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp 195–228
Klein RJT,Midgley GF, Preston BL, AlamM, Berkhout FGH, DowK, ShawMR (2014) Adaptation
opportunities, constraints, and limits. In: FieldCB,BarrosVR,DokkenDJ,MachKJ,Mastrandrea
MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN,
MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds). Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group II to the fifth
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel of climate change. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 899–943.
Klinke A, Renn O (2002) A new approach to risk evaluation and management: risk-based,
precaution-based, and discourse-based strategies. Risk Anal 22:1071–1094
Klinsky S, Dowlatabadi H (2009) Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy. Clim Policy
9:88–108
Landauer M, Juhola S (2018) Loss and damage in the rapidly changing arctic. In: Mechler R,
Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate
change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp 425–447
Linnerooth-Bayer J, Surminski S, Bouwer LM, Noy I, Mechler R (2018) Insurance as a response to
loss and damage? In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds)
Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham,
pp 483–512
Lopez A, Surminski S, Serdeczny O (2018) The role of the physical sciences in loss and damage
decision-making. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds)
Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham,
pp 261–285
Mace MJ, Verheyen R (2016) Loss, damage and responsibility after COP21: all options open for
the Paris agreement. Rev Eur Commun Int Environ Law 25:197–214
Magrin GO, Marengo JA, Boulanger J-P, Buckeridge MS, Castellanos E, Poveda G, Scarano FR,
Vicuña S (2014) Central and South America. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ,
Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel
ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change 2014: Impacts,
adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group
II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel of climate change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp 1499–1566
Mann ME, Rahmstorf S, Kornhuber K, Steinman BA, Miller SK, Coumou D (2017) Influence of
anthropogenic climate change on planetary wave resonance and extreme weather events. Nat Sci
Rep 7:45242. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep45242
Mechler R, Bouwer L (2015) Reviewing trends and projections of global disaster losses and climate
change: is vulnerability the missing link? Clim Change 133(1):23–35
Mechler R, Bouwer L, Linnerooth-Bayer J, Hochrainer-Stigler S, Aerts J, Surminski S (2014)
Managing unnatural disaster risk from climate extremes. Nat Clim Change 4:235–237
4 The Risk and Policy Space for Loss and Damage … 109
Mechler R et al (2018) Science for loss and damage. Findings and propositions. In: Mechler R,
Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate
change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp 3–37
Mechler R, Schinko T (2016) Identifying the policy space for climate loss and damage. Science
354(6310):290–292. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aag2514
Mysiak J, Surminski S, Thieken A, Mechler R, Aerts J (2015) Brief communication: Sendai frame-
work for disaster risk reduction—success or warning sign for Paris? Nat Hazards Earth Sys Sci
- Discuss 3:3955–3966. https://doi.org/10.5194/nhessd-3-3955-2015
Nansen Conference (2011) Climate change and displacement in the 21 Century, Oslo, Norway, June
5–7, 2011. www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2017
Nicholls RJ, Marinova N, Lowe JA, Brown S, Vellinga P, De Gusmão D, Hinkel J, Tol RSJ (2011)
Sea-level rise and its possible impacts given a ‘beyond4 zC world’ in the twenty-first century.
Philos Trans Royal Soc A 369:161–181
Nurse LA, McLean R, Agard J, Briguglio L, Duvat-Magnan V, Pelesikoti N, Webb A (2014) Small
islands. In: Barros VR, Field CB, Dokken DJ, Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Bilir TE, Chatterjee
M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN,MacCracken S,Mastrandrea
PR, White LL (eds). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA, pp 1613–1654
Ott K (2004) Ethical claims about the basic foundations on climate change policies. Workshop on
Climate Policies, Greifswald, Germany
Paavola J, Adger WN (2006) Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecol Econ 56(4):594–609
Posner EA, Weisbach D (2010) Climate change justice. Princeton University Press
Roser D, Huggel C, Ohndorf M, Wallimann-Helmer I (2015) Advancing the interdisciplinary dia-
logue on climate justice. Clim Change 133:349–359
Schäfer L, Warner K, Kreft S (2018) Exploring and managing adaptation frontiers with climate
risk insurance. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss
and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp
317–341
Schaller et al (2016) Human influence on climate in the 2014 southern England winter floods and
their impacts. Nat Clim Change 6:627–634. https://doi.org/10.1038/NCLIMATE2927
Schinko T, Mechler R (2017) Applying recent insights from climate risk management to opera-
tionalize the loss and damage mechanism. Ecol Econ 136:296–298. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ec
olecon.2017.02.008
Schinko T, Mechler R, Hochrainer-Stigler S (2016) Developing a methodological framework for
operationalizing iterative climate risk management based on insights from the case of Austria.
Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change 22(7):1063–1086. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-016-9713-0
Serdeczny O (2018) Non-economic loss and damage and the Warsaw international mechanism. In:
Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from
climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp 205–220
ShueH (1992) The unavoidability of justice. In: Hurrell A,KingsburyB (eds), The international pol-
itics of the environment: actors, interests and institutions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 373–397
Shue H (1993) Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15(1):39–59
Shue H (1999) Global environment and international inequality. Int Aff 75(3):531–545
Singer P (2002) One world: the ethics of globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT
Singer P (2006) Ethics and climate change. Environ Values 15(3):415–422
Sprinz D, von Bünau S (2013) The compensation fund for climate impacts. Weather Clim Soc
5:210–220. https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-12-00010.1
Stone D et al (2013) The challenge to detect and attribute effects of climate change on human and
natural systems. Clim Change 121:381–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0873-6
Thompson A, Otto FEL (2015) Ethical and normative implications of weather event attribution for
policy discussions concerning loss and damage. Clim Change 133:439–451
Trenberth K, Fasullo JT, Shepherd TG (2015) Attribution of climate extreme events. Nat Clim
Change 5:725–730. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2657
110 T. Schinko et al.
UNFCCC (2014) Decision 2/CP.19. Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage asso-
ciated with climate change. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=6.
Accessed 11 Oct 2017
UNFCCC (2015a) Adoption of the Paris agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev1. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFCCC (2015b) Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013 2015 review. Decision
FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1
UNISDR (2015) Making development sustainable: the future of disaster risk management. Global
assessment report on disaster risk reduction. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
(UNISDR), Geneva, Switzerland
UnitedNations (1992)UNFrameworkConvention onClimate Change (UNFCCC). UnitedNations,
New York
van der Geest K, de Sherbinin A, Kienberger S, Zommers Z, Sitati A, Roberts E, James R (2018)
The impacts of climate change on ecosystem services and resulting losses and damages to people
and society. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S, Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss
and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options. Springer, Cham, pp
221–236
Vanderheiden S (2008) Atmospheric justice: a political theory of climate change. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Verheyen R, Roderick P (2008) Beyond adaptation—the legal duty to pay compensation for climate
change damage. WWF-UK, Climate Change Programme discussion paper
Verheyen R (2012) Tackling loss & damage–a new role for the climate regime? Climate and Devel-
opment Knowledge Network
Wallimann-Helmer I, Meyer L, Mintz-Woo K, Schinko T, Serdeczny O (2018) Ethical challenges
in the context of climate loss and damage. In: Mechler R, Bouwer L, Schinko T, Surminski S,
Linnerooth-Bayer J (eds) Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy
options. Springer, Cham, pp 39–62
WBGU-German Advisory Council on Global Change (1998) World in transition: strategies for
managing global environmental risks. Springer, Berlin
WWA (2017) Kenya Drought, 2016. World Weather Attribution. https://wwa.climatecentral.org/a
nalyses/kenya-drought-2016/. Accessed 11 Oct 2017
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
